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III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Amended Judgment entered by the Fourth Judicial District

Court in and for Ada County, Idaho (the "District Court"), Case No. CV OC 1219536,
consolidated with Case No. CV OC 1406615. The Amended Judgment is in the amount of
$2,929,383.31, and the District Court entered it on February 24, 2017. R Vol. I, p. 6101.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT, AND DISPOSITION
On October 25, 2012, Appellant KDN Management Inc. ("KDN") commenced Case No.

CV QC 1219536 by filing a complaint asserting a claim for breach of contract, and related
claims, against Appellee WinCo Foods, LLC d/b/a WinCo Foods ("WinCo") and WinCo
Holdings, Inc. R Vol. I, p. 35. KDN sought repayment on three invoices for concrete repair
work performed, in the amount of $340,667.50, plus interest an attorney fees. R Vol. I, p. 45-46.
On December 7, 2012, WinCo answered and counterclaimed against KDN, asserting that KDN
had overbilled WinCo in the amount of approximately $769,000 for the concrete repair work
WinCo performed. R Vol. I, p. 50, 68.
On April 18, 2013, the District Court entered an order dismissing KDN' s claims against
WinCo with prejudice. R Vol. I, p. 107. On February 7, 2014, WinCo moved for summary
judgment against KDN on its claims. R Vol. I, p. 152. KDN did not oppose that motion. R Vol.
I, p. 779.
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On April 1, 2014, WinCo commenced Case No. CV OC 1406615, asserting claims
against Kym D. Nelson ("Nelson"), SealSource International, LLC ("SealSource"), and KD3
Flooring LLC ("KD3"). 1 R Vol. I, p. 843. Specifically, WinCo asserted a fraud claim against
Nelson arising from her alleged participation in intentionally overbilling WinCo on three
invoices. R Vol. I, p. 850. WinCo asserted a claim for breach of contract and related claims, as
well as a claim for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, against Nelson, SealSource,
and KD3, for overbilling. R Vol. I, p. 851-52. The District Court consolidated Case No. CV
OC 1219536 into Case No. CV OC 1406615. R Vol. I, p. 1179.
On May 5, 2015, WinCo filed an Amended Complaint against the Nelson Parties. R Vol.
I, p. 1370. WinCo retained its previously-asserted claims, but also added an alter ego claim,
against all the Nelson Parties. R Vol. I, p. 1381-83. On October 14, 2015, WinCo filed a
Second Amended Complaint, seeking an increased amount of damages and adding a second
claim for fraud and a fraudulent transfer claim, against Nelson. R Vol. I, p. 2666, 2675, 268081.
Although the case had been scheduled as a jury trial since its inception, and despite
WinCo's prior stipulation to a jury trial and the Nelson Parties' motion, pursuant to Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 39(b), for a jury trial, on November 20, 2015, the District Court scheduled a
bench trial. R Vol. I, p. 22. The bench trial occurred on May 31, June 1-2, 6- 9, and 21-22,
2016. R Vol. I, p. 28- 30. On October 5, 2016, the District Court entered Findings of Fact and

1

This briefrefers to KDN, Nelson, SealSource, and KD3 collectively as the "Nelson

Parties."
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Conclusions of Law. R Vol. I, p. 5003. On October 14, 2016, the District Court entered
judgment in favor of WinCo, and against each of the Nelson Parties, in the principal amount of
$903,724.50. R Vol. I, p. 5063. On February 2, 2014, after granting WinCo's motion for
attorney fees and costs, the District Court entered an Amended Judgment in favor of WinCo, and
against each of the Nelson Parties, in the principal amount of$2,929,383.31. R Vol. I, p. 6071,
6101. Also on February 24, 2017, the District Court denied the Nelson Parties' previously-filed
motion for relief pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59. R Vol. I, p. 6071. The Nelson
Parties filed their notice of appeal on April 7, 2017. R Vol. I, p. 6104.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Parties

KDN was a Utah corporation that was incorporated in Utah on February 18, 2010. R
Vol. I, p. 5007; Tr Vol. II, p. 2230 L. 178-p. 2231, L. 10 & Ex. 91. From February 18, 2010,
until KDN's cessation, Nelson was KDN's sole shareholder and one of two directors. R Vol. I,
p. 5007; Tr Vol. I, p. 1058 L. 11-16; Vol. II, p. 1344 L. 13-17. KDN was ans-corporation. Tr
Vol. II, p. 1344 L. 10-12. On or about April 26, 2010, KDN received, from the Internal Revenue
Service, notice of its acceptance as ans-corporation. Tr Vol. II, p. 2228, L. 7-18 & Ex. 515.
Nelson intended that KDN conduct business, and that it interface with WinCo, under the trade
name "KD Concrete Design." Tr Vol. II, p. 1355, L. 21-24.
KD3 is a Utah limited liability company formed in 2006. R Vol. I, p. 5007; Tr Vol. II, p.
1626, L. 15-p. 1627, L. 6 & Ex. 100; p. 2136 L. 7-9. From the date ofKD3's creation through
2009 and 2010, Nelson was one of several members ofKD3 and its sole manager. R Vol. I, p.
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1007; Tr Vol. II, p. 1627, L. 7-p. 1629, L. 20 & Ex. 100. KD3 is a labor company-it furnishes
labor for concrete sealant and repair. Tr Vol. II, p. 1638, L. 17-22; p. 2098, L. 8-10; p. 2135, L.
13-20.
SealSource is a Utah limited liability company formed in 2002. R Vol. I, p. 5007.
During 2010 and the majority of 2011, Nelson was a minority member of Seal Source, and she
was not a manager of Seal Source. Tr Vol. I, p. 1144, L. 23- p. 1145, L. 3. SealSource is a
distributor of concrete sealant and color materials used to protect and repair concrete. Tr Vol. II,
p. 1648,L.22-p. 1649,L. 5.
WinCo is in the business of "the sale of grocery items." R Vol. I, p. 5006; Tr Vol. I, p.
726, L. 2-5. Although it is headquartered in Boise, Idaho, it has "operating stores and
distribution centers in Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, [and]
Texas." R Vol. I, p. 5006; Tr Vol. I, p. 726, L. 11-14. It has 16,000 employees working in 107
stores. R Vol. I, p. 5006; Tr Vol. I, p. 722, L. 17-22.
Although not parties to this proceeding, certain individuals performed key roles for
WinCo. Tom Little ("Little") was a WinCo maintenance engineer stationed at WinCo's
corporate headquarters from 2007 to 2011. Tr Vol. I, p. 775, L. 14-22. In that capacity, Little
supervised the maintenance of all WinCo stores and was responsible for approving invoices from
contractors who had performed maintenance work at WinCo stores, where those invoices were
under $50,000. Tr Vol. I, p. 776, L. 20-p. 777, L. 7. If an invoice was in excess of $50,000,
Little would ask certain individuals in management to approve and sign the invoice. R Vol. I, p.
5016. One of those individuals was David Van Etten ("Van Etten"). Tr Vol. I, p. 777, L. 8-17.
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Finally, beginning in and around 2006, Jim Douty ("Douty") served as a WinCo maintenance
supervisor in WinCo's Boise, Idaho division. R. Vol. I, p. 50 IO; Tr Vol. I, p. 851, L. 12-p. 852,
L. 8. In that capacity, Douty supervised the maintenance of all WinCo stores within his sphere

of responsibility, including floor maintenance. Tr Vol. I, p. 853, L. 1-17.

2.

The Business Relationship Between WinCo and the Nelson Parties

There was some history between Nelson and WinCo prior to the transactions that gave
rise to this litigation. Specifically, prior to 2009, SealSource "suppl[ied] cleaning supplies, floor
supplies to the [WinCo] stores." R Vol. I, p. 5007; Tr Vol. I, p. 783, L. 1-2.
As that relationship progressed, WinCo and Nelson discussed whether Nelson's thenbusiness-either SealSource or KD3-could perform joint repair work at WinCo stores. R Vol.
I, p. 5010; Tr Vol. I, p. 783, L. 3-13. Beginning in approximately September 2008, KD3 began
seeking to obtain concrete joint repair work from WinCo by submitting a proposal, in its name,
to WinCo. R Vol. I, p. 5010; Tr Vol. I, p. 783, L. 114-p. 785, L. 9 & Ex. 49; p. 1090, L. 24-p.
1091, L. 12 & Ex. 41. Although it did not do so initially, KD3 later directed proposals to Little
specifically. R Vol. I, p. 5011; Tr Vol. I, p. 785, L. 10-25 & Ex. 42. However, in December
2009, Nelson informed WinCo that she intended to form KDN as the entity that would actually
enter into the contract with WinCo for joint repair work. Tr Vol. I, p. 1074, L. 15-21.
Furthermore, on or about January 21, 2010, Nelson again informed WinCo-specifically,
Little-that KDN would be formed to enter into any contract with WinCo for joint repair work.
Tr Vol. I, p. 1099, L. 17-p. 1100, L. 2. Negotiations proceeded, aimed at forming an agreement
whereby KDN would perform joint repair services, as a general contractor, for WinCo stores. Tr
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Vol 1, p. 1350, L. 10-p. 1354, L. 6. Those negotiations involved discussions regarding price,
identification of the stores that would receive joint repair work, and a start date. Id.; R Vol. I, p.
5011-12.
Given those variables, Nelson deemed that an agreement had been reached when KDN
actually commenced work actually commenced on a particular store. Tr Vol. II, p. 2112, L. 11p. 2113, L. 2. Nelson's belief that an agreement as reached was supported by the fact that
WinCo retained the ability throughout the project to pull any store that it had previously
identified as needing work. Tr Vol. I, p. 803, L. 2-9; Tr Vol. II, p. 2267, p. 8-25. And as of
February 10, 2010, KDN still awaited a start date for work on any store. Tr Vol. I, p. 796, L. 215 & Ex. 56. As noted above, Nelson formed KDN as a Utah corporation on February 18, 2010.
R Vol. 1, p. 5014; Tr Vol. II, p. 1289, L. 21-23, Ex. 91. On February 16, 2010, KDN ordered
material needed to perform the joint repair work. Tr Vol. I, p. 1107, L. 3-23 & Ex. 57. KDN
commenced work on a WinCo store thereafter. Critically, prior to February 18, 2010-the date
of its formation-KDN had performed no work of any kind on any WinCo store and received no
payment from WinCo. Tr Vol. II, p. 1355, L. 15-18; p. 1355, L. 25-p. 1356, L. 1-3.
Critically, KDN's contract with WinCo initially pertained to concrete joint repair work
on only one store. KDN was required to obtain approval from WinCo to perform work on any
additional store. Tr Vol. II, p. 2184, L. 4-p. 2185, L. 14 & Ex. 629. At most, WinCo's initial
arrangement with KDN was for work on three stores, all of them in the Portland, Oregon area.
Tr Vol. II, p. 2241, L. 10-18 & Ex. 626. That work was to be a trial period (the "Trial Period").
WinCo would retain KDN for additional stores in WinCo's Portland, Oregon, area and agree as
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to terms (including identification of stores) at that time (the "Portland Agreement"), if WinCo
was satisfied with KDN's work during the Trial Period. R Vol. I, p. 5012. The Trial Period
evolved into the Portland Agreement, which encompassed KDN' s work on additional stores in
the Portland, Oregon, area. R Vol. I, p. 5015; Tr Vol. II, p. 2358, L. 8-11. In tum, the Portland
Agreement evolved into another, new and separate, agreement by which KDN would perform
joint repair work for WinCo stores in WinCo's Boise, Idaho area (the "Boise Agreement"). Tr
Vol. II, p. 2267, L. 8-13. KDN had not yet finalized the terms of the Boise Agreement even by
May 3, 2010. Tr Vol. I, p. 871, L. 5-p. 872, L. 9 & Ex. 586.
The testimony at trial was undisputed that WinCo did not believe that it ever contracted
with Nelson personally. Little believed that WinCo had contracted with "KD Concrete," which
he understood was a business entity and not Nelson personally. R Vol. I, p. 5012; Tr Vol. I, p.
817, L. 5-13. He also did not believe that Win Co had contracted with either SealSource or
KD3. Tr Vol. I, p. 816, L. 5-23. Little specifically referred to the business entity with which he
dealt as "KD Concrete Design." Tr Vol. I, p. 829, L. 4-8 & Ex. 646. In fact, in a declaration
filed in this case in October 2013, Little referred to both "KD Concrete Design, Inc." and "KDN"
as the party with which WinCo had contracted, betraying his knowledge of both KDN' s name
and its status as a corporation. Tr Vol. I, p. 822, L. 21-p. 924, L. 25 & Ex. 578. That
designation could not have been accidental: although Little "wrote ... out" the declaration "to a
certain point," WinCo's counsel "rewrote [the declaration] for [Little] to proofread and sign." Tr
Vol. I, p. 825, L. 1-19.
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For his part, Douty believed that WinCo had contracted with KD Concrete, which he
understood was a division of SealSource. Tr Vol. I, p. 866, L. 2-8. Douty understood that KD
Concrete was a separate business entity. Tr Vol. I, p. 876, L. 25-p. 877, L. 20. Douty cannot
recollect why he believed KD Concrete was a division of SealSource, other than he "assumed
that that was [Nelson's] company and that she hired out the labor." Tr Vol. I, p. 866, L. 11-p.
867, L. 10 & Ex. 73. Although Douty saw emails referring to "KD3 Concrete Design," he
simply assumed that that designation referred to KD Concrete because "the name of the entity
doing the floor repair wasn't terribly material" to him, and that he "assume[ d] that [KD
Concrete] was the company that was coming in to do the joint repair." Tr Vol. I, p. 875, L. 7-p.
876, L. 11 & Ex. 593 and 517.
Finally, Van Etten reviewed discovery responses issued by WinCo in this case. Those
discovery responses either admit, or do not dispute, that KDN entered into a contract with
WinCo to perform the concrete joint repair work at issue in this case. Tr Vol. I, p. 754, L. 20-p.
758, L. 1. Van Etten was also aware of the decision by WinCo to assert a counterclaim against
KDN, specifically, for breach of contract. Tr Vol. I, p. 751, L. 21-p. 752, L. 3.
The takeaway is that nobody with boots on the ground at WinCo thought that WinCo had
contracted with Nelson personally. All of them believed that WinCo had contracted with at least
a business entity affiliated with Nelson. Little's declaration testimony indicates that he knew the
name of the entity was KDN, and that it was a corporation.
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3.

KDN's Post-Trial Period Disclosure of Its Principal Status to Win Co

After the inception of the Trial Period, but before the Portland Agreement and certainly
before the Boise Agreement, Nelson and KDN continued to disclose KDN as the entity
performing the work and Nelson's principal.
On March 26, 2010, Nelson sent an email to Little asking if WinCo needed a tax
identification number to facilitate payment for the joint repair work on the WinCo stores. Tr
Vol. I, p. 1108, L. 7 -p. 1109, L. 4 & Ex. 65. On April 16, 2010, either Nelson or Karen
Thompson ("Thompson"), an individual that performed work for KDN, sent an email to Marci
Foster ("Foster"), of WinCo, from an email address denominated "kdnconcrete@gmail.com" and
with a footer identifying "KD Concrete Design." Tr Vol. I, p. 742, L. 1-p. 743, L. 3. In that
email, Nelson or Thompson asked Foster if WinCo required a W-9 form so that KDN's invoices
(issued under the name "KD Concrete Design") could be paid. Tr Vol. I, p. 741, L. 15-p. 743, L.
12 & Ex. 500. In that email, Nelson or Thompson stated that "[w]e are a new contractor doing
work for WinCo." Tr Vol. I, p. 743, L. 6-12. Foster forwarded that email to Little and to Van
Etten and asked them to confirm if "either of [them] know what this vendor is doing for us and if
their invoices should be going through us or a General Contractor." Tr Vol. I, p. 741, L. 15-p.
743, L. 12 & Ex. 500. KDN then received a letter, on WinCo letterhead, from Marcia Kaiser
("Kaiser"), of WinCo, requesting the return of a completed W-9 form requesting a taxpayer
identification number and certification. Tr Vol. II, p. 2246, L. 16-p. 224 7, L. 19 & Ex. 501.
KDN returned, to WinCo (via Kaiser), a completed W-9 form identifying KDN and furnishing
KDN' s tax identification number. R Vol. I, p. 5014; Tr Vol. I, p. 911, L. 5- p. 912, L. 5 & Ex.
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688; Tr Vol. II, p. 2247, L. 21-25, p. 2255, L. 7-12. Also, on April 30, 2010, Nelson sent
WinCo (via Kaiser) a copy of KDN's articles of incorporation. Tr Vol. II, p. 2260, L. 14-24. In
connection with the furnishing of the W-9, Nelson, along with Thompson, again informed Little
in April 2010 that "KD Concrete is KDN Management, Inc." Tr Vol. II, p. 2298, L. 7-p. 2299,
L. 1.
Although WinCo's policy and practice is to issue one payment without a signed,
completed W-9 form on file, that is an exception limited to one payment; WinCo will not pay
more than one invoice without a signed, completed W-9 form on file. R Vol. I, p. 5014. In fact,
WinCo made substantial payments to KD Concrete following April 30, 2010. Tr Vol. I, p. 912,
L. 20-p. 913, L.13. Therefore, at least by April 30, 2010, WinCo must have had KDN's signed

W-9-identifying "KDN Management Inc."-on file. R Vol. I, p. 5014.
These post-Trial Period disclosures make clear that, at the barest minimum, WinCo knew
it was dealing with KDN prior to entering into the Portland Agreement and, certainly, the Boise
Agreement. 2

4.

The Nelson Parties' Separateness and KDN's Operations as an SCorporation

Out of each of the Nelson Parties, KDN was the entity that received and accounted for
payment from WinCo for joint repair work and deposited those payments in a KDN bank

At least one additional disclosure occurred. On or about July 27, 2010, KDN paid
WinCo-via a check labeled "KDN Management Inc."-$4,883.00, with a memo line
referencing that the funds were for "damaged produce," which involved produce allegedly
compromised by the joint repair work at a WinCo store in Boise. Tr Vol. II, p. 2268, L. 1-19 &
Ex. 642.
2
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account. Tr Vol. II, p. 2005, L. 23-25; p. 2014, L. 9-p. 2016, L. 7 & Ex. 545. As noted above,
KDN was ans-corporation-a key fact in analyzing its operations and its financial relationship
with the other Nelson Parties. 3
For starters, and for the Court's context, the Nelson Parties were a lot more separate than
the District Court's decision suggests. KD3, KDN, and SealSource were each separately
organized in Utah. Tr Vol. II, p. 1808, L. 11-15 & Exs. 91, 93,100,689,559,562,681,690,
and 691. KD3, KDN, SealSource, and Nelson each had separate bank accounts. Tr Vol. II, p.
1624, L. 21-25; p. 1918, L. 16-21; p. 1213, L. 13-15 & Exs. 193, 194, 115. KD3 , KDN, and
SealSource also had separate bookkeepers. Tr Vol. II, p. 1805, L. 22-25; p. 1807, L. 1-5. They
also each maintained separate QuickBooks files. Tr Vol. II, p. 1623, L. 9-19; p. 1625, L. 1-8; p.
1809, L. 4-21. They also utilized separate accountants or tax preparers. Tr Vol. II, p. 1807, L.
6-p. 1808, L. 1. KD3 and SealSource also utilized separate credit cards. Tr Vol. II, p. 1939, L.
11-17.
KD3, KDN and SealSource each filed separate tax returns. Tr Vol. II, p. 1808, L. 2-8 &
Exs.203,204,205,375,377,379,382,383,385,387,540,541,542,543,544,545,546,547,

At trial, WinCo offered the testimony of Karen Ginnett, CPA ("Ginnett") to render a
conclusion that corporate formalities were not respected between Ms. Nelson and the Nelson
Entities. By her own admission, Ginnett analyzed the books and records of the Nelson Entities at
a higher standard than even an IRS audit. Tr Vol. II, p. 1791, L. 24-25; p. 1087, L. 1-8. Other
than generally referring to "accounting standards" and "IRS standards," Ginnett could not
articulate the applicable standard of review she relied upon when rendering her opinions. Tr
Vol. II, p. 1793, L. 14- 22. Ginnett is not a licensed CPA in the state of Utah. Tr Vol. II, p.
1797, L. 19-20. Ginnett had never analyzed an entity relative to veil piercing or alter ego
claims, Tr Vol. II, p. 1799, L. 7-12, nor had she testified in any case that involved veil piercing
or alter ego claims before, Tr Vol. II, p. 1979, L. 9- 23.
3
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548,549,550,551, 552,553,554,555,564,565,566,567,568,569,566, and 567. Nelson also
filed her own personal tax returns. Critically, because all three of the Nelson Party entitiesKD3, SealSource, and most importantly KDN, which was ans-corporation-were pass-through
entities, Nelson paid the income taxes for the entities on her personal tax return. Tr Vol. II, p.
1917,L.22-25;p. 1918,L. 1--4;p. 1920,L.9-16;p.2019,L.3-10&Exs.568,569,570.
When WinCo issued a check to "KD Concrete Design," it would be deposited into
KDN's bank account. Tr Vol. II, p. 2005, L. 23-25; p. 2014, L. 9-p. 2016, L. 7 & Ex. 545.
Nelson did not transfer funds from KDN to any personal accounts. Tr Vol. II, p. 1911, L. 20-23.
Rather, because KDN was organized as an s-corporation, Nelson understood that all income
flowed to her personally, and that she was responsible to pay the tax obligation for income to
KDN. Tr Vol. II, p. 1344, L. 18-p. 1345, L. 6. Based on the advice of her accountant, Mark
Whittaker ("Whittaker"), Nelson understood that she could utilize KDN's funds for personal
expenses so long as such payments were categorized as distributions. Tr Vol. II, p. 2039, L. 5-p.
2040, L. 7. And Nelson and Whittaker attempted to properly book those expenses as
distributions. Tr Vol. II, p. 2036, L. 24-p .2038, L. 7. Whittaker advised Nelson on how to
categorize these expenses and expressed no concern to Nelson over how they were being booked
in KDN's records. Tr Vol. II, p. 2040, L. 1-p. 2041, L. 9; p. 2042, L. 3-16; p. 2042, L. 22- p.
2043, L. 2. If Whittaker questioned whether something was really a business expense, he would
inquire further to see if there was a "reasonable explanation." Tr Vol. II, p. 2063, L. 7-p. 1360,
L. 15. He did advise the characterization of certain expenses, where appropriate, as shareholder

distributions. Tr Vol. II, p. 2064, L. 7-p. 2065, L. 15. Whittaker deemed Nelson "entitled" to
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use KDN's money in this way because Nelson had already paid taxes on those funds. Tr Vol. II,
p.2068,L. 14-p.2070,L. 18;p.2071,L. 15-22.
Joel Christensen ("Christensen") served for periods of time as bookkeeper for KD3 and
SealSource. 4 Tr Vol. II, p. 1618, L. 22-p. 1619, L. 1. Christensen characterized himself as
"pretty conservative" with respect to the classification of expenses as business or personal, and
he "lean[ed] towards the personal expense side if there was any question." Tr Vol. II, p. 1645, L.
13-22. According to Christensen, Nelson relied upon him "as the accountant to help her
understand the accounting side and properly classify expenses and revenues and follow those
rules." Tr Vol. II, p. 1621, L. 14-19. Christensen advised KD3 and Sealsource regarding
general business expenses, accounting for travel expenses and vehicle business expenses. Tr
Vol. II, p. 1640, L. 12-p. 1642, L. 19. He recollects "times where we went back and forth to
make sure" that expenses would be classified correctly. Tr Vol. II, p. 1645, L. 4-9.
KDN finished its work for WinCo in August 2010. Tr Vol. II, p. 2269, L. 23-25 - p.
2270, L. 1-4. WinCo first asserted that KDN had overbilled WinCo on approximately May 4,
2012, nearly two years later. Tr. Vol. II, p. 1529, L. 8-24 & Ex. 421. WinCo did not assert any
legal claim against KDN, of any kind, until December 7, 2012. Tr Vol. II, p. 1344, L. 5-9. By
that time, Nelson-having heard no formal grievances from WinCo-had utilized virtually all of

Christensen worked with SealSource for a "short stint" in 2009, left, and returned in late
2011. He worked there until April 2014. Tr Vol. II, p. 1619, L. 22-p. 1620, L. 6. During the
time Christensen was not at SealSource, Jane Marriott, and then Corby Van Valkenburg, served
as Seal Source's internal accountants. Tr Vol. II, p. 164 7, L. 23-p. 1648, L. 6.
4
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KDN's funds. Tr Vol. II, p. 1916, L. 15-19. KDN ceased business in 2012. Tr Vol. II, p. 1916,
L. 15-19.

5.

The Scheduling of a Bench Trial Rather Than a Jury Trial

On November 3, 2015, the Nelson Parties filed an answer to WinCo's Second Amended
Complaint. R Vol. I, p. 3232. That answer concluded with a section entitled "Reliance Upon
Jury Trial Demand," and stating that "[t]he Nelson Parties hereby rely upon all prior demands for
jury trial submitted by any party to this lawsuit." R Vol. I, p. 3245.
On January 2, 2013, the District Court held a scheduling conference. R Vol. I, p. 4.
Following that hearing, on January 9, 2013, the District Court scheduled a five-day jury trial, to
begin on December 9, 2013. R Vol. I, p. 4. Dispelling any doubt, the District Court set the case
for jury trial an additional/our times: on August 22, 2013, November 13, 2014, April 9, 2015,
and November 20, 2015. R Vol. I, p. 7, 13, 15, 22. Critically, on November 12, 2014-a day
prior to setting the case for jury trial for the third time-WinCo and the Nelson Parties filed a
Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning, signed by counsel for both sides. There, WinCo and
the Nelson Parties stipulated to a "12 Person Jury Trial." 5
On August 14, 2015, during a hearing, the District Court and WinCo's counsel discussed
WinCo's theory and suggested procedure for proving the Nelson Parties' liability. There, the
following exchange between WinCo and the District Court occurred:

This stipulation was inadvertently omitted from the record on appeal. Concurrently
with this brief, the Nelson Parties file a motion to augment the record with this stipulation and
supply it to WinCo for use in its response brief.
5
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THE COURT: The way it would work is the court would submit the issue
to the jury on an advisory basis as it relates to the piercingMS. MARTINSON: Correct.
THE COURT: -and incorporate the jury's findings into its finding and
conclusions as to piercing. And in order to do that, we would have to submit the
issue ofKDN's liability at the same time, wouldn't we?
MS. MARTINSON: Yes, I would agree with you on that one.
Tr Vol. I, p. 122, L. 9-18. At the same hearing, WinCo asked the Court ifit should prepare jury
instructions. Tr Vol. I, p. 147, Ll-2.
During a November 20, 2015, hearing, the Nelson Parties, WinCo, and the District Court
engaged in a lengthy discussion scheduling trial, as well as discussing the District Court's
procedures and preferences for how to conduct a jury trial, particularly where WinCo asserted
both legal and equitable claims. Tr Vol. I, p. 341, L. 22-p. 344, L. 14. The following exchange
occurred:
MR. JOHNSON: All right. May I also ask the Court's routine on
equitable remedies like alter ego?
THE COURT: Right.
MR. JOHNSON: Will the Court have the jury determine the facts relative
to that and the Court then use those facts to determine the remedy or will the
Court be the finder of fact as well.
THE COURT: So the Supreme Court in Idaho has indicated on equitable
issues that those are court issues, obviously. But the Court can use advisory
findings by the jury to use as part of its findings.
My practice is generally to use the jury is [sic] an advisory fact finder.
Now, it's not a rule that's set in stone and, certainly, if there's a-I'll look
at that issue, but that's my general preference. And we can talk about that as we
bet [sic] closer.
Tr Vol. I, p. 343, L. 21-p. 344, L. 14. At no time did WinCo raise any issue regarding the
convening of a jury trial. Tr Vol. I, p. 343, L. 21-p. 344, L. 14.
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On April 4, 2016, WinCo filed an objection to jury trial. R Vol. I, p. 3929. There, it
argued that because no written jury demand had been filed, there could be no jury trial on
WinCo's claims. Rather, WinCo's claims would be tried to the District Court. R Vol, I, p. 3929.
According to the District Court's docket, that filing marks the first time in the course of the
case-since October 2012-that WinCo had ever stated any inclination to have any kind of trial
other than a jury trial. R Vol. I, p. 3-25. On April 29, 2016, the Nelson Parties filed a response
to WinCo's objection. R Vol. I, p. 3947. Also on April 29, 2016, the Nelson Parties filed a
motion seeking a jury trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b). R Vol. I, p. 3953.
At a hearing held on May 5, 2016, the District Court conceded that it "was under the
assumption that it was going to be a jury trial" and had "been for some long time." Tr Vol. I, p.
350, L. 2--4. WinCo's counsel observed that on March 25, 2016, the District Court's staff had
sent an email asking the parties whether the case would be tried to a jury or to the District Court.
Tr Vol. I, p. 352, L. 13-16. At a separate hearing on March 30, 2016, WinCo's counsel
"indicated that he thought that a jury trial would be acceptable to WinCo as well." Tr Vol. I, p.
372, L. 3-6. The District Court was unable to locate the aforementioned stipulation by WinCo to
a jury trial, and-ostensibly owing to the oppressive length and complexity of the case, neither
WinCo nor the Nelson Parties could point the District Court to that stipulation either. Tr Vol. I,
p. 370, L. 21-p. 371, L. 3. The Court granted WinCo's objection to the jury trial and denied the
Nelson Parties' Rule 39(b) motion on the ground that, without a demand or a stipulation, "there
are a lot of issues in this case that are equitable in nature" that "in large measure predominat[ e]
here." Tr Vol. I, p. 372, L. 15-p. 373, L. 16.
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IV.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the District Court commit an error or law or abuse its discretion by deeming

the Nelson Parties to have waived their right to a jury trial or, alternatively, by denying the
Nelson Parties' motion for a jury trial, brought pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b)?
2.

Did the District Court erroneously impose personal liability upon Nelson, either

on the ground that KDN constitutes an undisclosed principal or pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-1204, for all WinCo stores at issue?
3.

Did the District Court base its determination that the Nelson Parties are each alter

egos of one another upon erroneous principles of law?
V.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Nelson Parties do not claim attorney fees on appeal.
VI.

ARGUMENT

The District Court misapplied key legal principles that incorrectly altered the result at
trial. For the following reasons, the Court should reverse the District Court on the following
three grounds.
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DEEMING THE
NELSON PARTIES TO HA VE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
OR, ALTERNATIVELY, BY DECLINING TO CONVENE A JURY TRIAL
PURSUANT TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 39(b).

This Court will review the District Court's refusal to order a jury trial pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b) for abuse of discretion. See City of Pocatello v. Anderton, l 06
Idaho 370,373,679 P.2d 647, 650 (1984). "This Court's test to determine whether a trial court
has abused its discretion consists of three parts: ' (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived
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the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3)
whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.'" Goodspeed v. Shippen, 154
Idaho 866, 869-70, 303 P.3d 225, 228-29 (2013) (quoting Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176,
179, 219 P .3d 1192, 1195 (2009)). The Court reviews questions oflaw de novo. See State v.
Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,865,264 P.3d 970, 972 (2011).
As the following sections demonstrate, the District Court acted inconsistent with legal
standards when it failed to recognize WinCo's stipulation to a jury trial. In the context of the
Nelson Parties' Rule 39(b) motion, it also failed to appreciate governing Idaho law specifying
that Rule 39(b) requests for jury trial are to be liberally granted, and it failed to appreciate the
unique reality that the District Court and every party to this case anticipated a jury trial for over
three years-owing, at least in part, to WinCo's own stipulation. The District Court's decision
denied the Nelson Parties of their right to a jury trial. This Court should therefore reverse the
District Court's refusal to convene a jury trial and remand to the District Court for proceedings
consistent with that reversal, including a jury trial.
1.

The District Court Scheduled a Jury Trial Numerous Times Based on
WinCo's Apparent Initial Stipulation and Explicit Subsequent Stipulation.

The Court correctly observed that there is no written jury demand filed prior to the
Nelson Parties' November 3, 2015, statement of "reliance." But there was, of necessity, a
stipulation. "A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed." See
Idaho R. Civ. P. 38(d). "When a jury trial has been demanded under Rule 38, the action must be

21

designated on the register of actions as a jury action." Idaho R. Civ. P. 39(a). In other words, in
a civil case, a jury trial must be demanded, and a demand results in the action being designated
as a jury action on the register of actions. It follows that if the action is designated as a jury
action on the register of actions, there must have been either a demand or a stipulation to a jury
trial.
The District Court docket evidences this stipulation. On January 2, 2013, the District
Court held a scheduling conference. R Vol. I, p. 4. The outcome of that scheduling conference
was not reduced to a written order, perhaps contributing to some confusion. But a week
thereafter, the District Court scheduled a five-day jury trial, to begin on December 9, 2013. R
Vol. I, p. 4. The scheduling conference plainly resulted in a stipulation to a jury trial. The case
was again set for a jury trial on August 22, 2013. R Vol. I, p. 7.
Dispelling any doubt, on November 12, 2014, WinCo and the Nelson Parties did file an
express, written stipulation to the convening of a "12 Person Jury Trial."6 Based ostensibly on at
least that stipulation (if not an earlier stipulation), the District Court set the case for jury trial an
additional three times: November 13, 2014, April 9, 2015, and November 20, 2015. R Vol. I, p.
13, 15, 22. WinCo never objected. R Vol. I, p. 3-25.
Furthermore, at no fewer than three hearings-August 14, 2015, November 20, 2015, and
March 30, 2016-the parties discussed the convening of a jury trial with the Court, including its
procedures and preferences for trying legal and equitable claims together. In fact, the March 30,

Again, concurrently with this brief, the Nelson Parties move to supplement the appellate
record with this stipulation.
6
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2016, hearing was predated, by five days, by an email from the District Court's staff asking the
parties whether the case was to be tried to a jury or to the District Court. On March 30, 2016,
WinCo did not object to a jury trial, but rather stated its belief that a jury trial was likely
acceptable to WinCo. 7
That is why the Nelson Parties "relied" on the notion of a prior jury demand when they
filed their response to WinCo's Second Amended Complaint-they thought, based on three
years oflitigation aimed at a jury trial, that the case was to be tried to a jury. In any event, but
particularly in this context, there is no material distinction between "demanding" a jury trial and
"relying" upon a prior demand for-or the prior scheduling of-a jury trial. A jury demand must
be in writing, "which may be included in a pleading," and served "no later than 14 days after the
last pleading directed to the issue is served." See Idaho R. Civ. P. 39(b)(l). The Nelson Parties
clearly did that: in their answer to WinCo's Second Amended Complaint, they stated, in writing,
that they desired, expected, and anticipated a jury trial. R Vol. I, p. 3245. "Demand" is not a
magic word. See Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting
that the requirement is simply that "the jury demand be sufficiently clear to alert a careful reader
that a jury trial is requested on an issue," and that "[t]his approach allows a great deal of
flexibility in how the request is made"); see also id. (although a request "certainly could have

Specifically, the District Court stated that it had "looked at the transcript of [the March
25, 2016) hearing" and observed that WinCo's counsel "indicated that he thought that a jury trial
would be acceptable to WinCo as well." The District Court then discounted WinCo's admission
by stating that it recognized "that he's not been lead counsel in this case and certainly hasn't
been the decision-maker on those kind of important issues, fundamental issues."
7
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been clearer, [it] did provide sufficient notice to the court and opposing counsel that [the
plaintiff] wanted a jury trial"). The Nelson Parties plainly expressed their intent that all issues
triable to a jury be so tried. They certainly did not offer "a voluntarily, intentional
relinquishment of a known right or advantage" sufficient to qualify as a waiver, and WinCo
certainly did not "act[] in reasonable reliance upon [such waiver] and ... thereby ... altered [its]
position to [its] detriment." See Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,256, 846
P.2d 904, 907.
Win Co stipulated to a jury trial-either expressly or by its conduct of this case for three
years. The Nelson Parties were entitled to rely upon WinCo's express or implied stipulation.

2.

Even If There Was No Express Stipulation to Try the Case to a Jury, the
District Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying the Nelson Parties' Rule
39(b) Motion.

Even leaving aside WinCo's stipulation, these circumstances are precisely the kind of
reason why Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b) exists. Although "[i]ssues on which a jury trial
is not properly demanded are to be tried by the court ... the court may, on motion, order a jury
trial on any issue for which a jury might have been demanded." Idaho R. Civ. P. 39(b). "It is

essential that, upon a request for a trial of issues by a jury, even after the time for demand for a
jury has elapsed, that the trial court liberally exercise its discretion in this regard to carry out the
designed purpose of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." R.E. W Cons tr. Co. v. Dist. Court of

the Third Judicial Dist., 88 Idaho 426,443,400 P.2d 390,401 (1965) (emphasis added). One of
the designed purposes of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedures is to preserve the right to a jury
trial: "[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution or as provided by a statute of the
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state ofldaho is preserved to the parties inviolate." See Idaho R. Civ. P. 38(a). Courts
construing the federal equivalent of Idaho's Rule 39(b) observe that Rule 39(b) motions "should
be granted when the parties opposing the motion fail to present 'strong and compelling reasons'
in support of their opposition." See, e.g., AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d 150,
155 (10th Cir. 1965). 8 More narrowly constrained applications of Rule 39(b):
seem to place the emphasis in the wrong place. Technical insistence upon
imposing a penalty for default by denying a jury trial is not in the spirit of the
rules. The rules do not limit the court's discretion in ordering a jury in cases in
which there would have been a right to jury trial. The court ought to approach
each application under Rule 39(b) with an open mind and an eye to the factual
situation in that particular case, rather than with a fixed policy against granting the
application or even a preconceived notion that applications of this kind are usually
to be denied.

See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure§ 2334, at 115-116 (1971) (footnotes
omitted). Courts should consider several factors in assessing a Rule 39(b) motion, including
"whether the issues are more appropriate for determination by a jury or a judge," "any prejudice
that granting a jury trial would cause the opposing party," "the timing of the motion," and "any
effect a jury trial would have on the court's docket and the orderly administration of justice."

See also Kitchen v. Chippewa Valley Schs., 825 F.2d 1004, 1013 (6th Cir. 1987) (a
court's discretion "should be exercised in favor of granting a jury trial in the absence of strong
and compelling reasons to the contrary" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Parrott v. Wilson,
707 F.2d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 1983) ("In this circuit, the general rule governing belatedjury
requests under Rule 39(b) is that the trial court should grant a jury trial in the absence of strong
and compelling reasons to the contrary." (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
Unum, Inc., 658 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1981) ("A motion for trial by jury submitted under Rule
39(b) should be favorably received unless there are persuasive reasons to deny it."); Littlefield v.
Fort Dodge Messenger, 614 F.2d 581,585 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[J]ury trials out to be liberally
granted when no prejudice results.").
8
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See Malbon v. Penn. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 636 F.2d 936,940 & n.11 (4th Cir. 1980); see also
Daniel Int'! Corp. v. Fishchbach & Moore, Inc., 916 F.2d 1061, 1064 (5th Cir. 1990) (same).
At least one court has already balanced these factors in almost the exact environment this
appeal presents. In Pinemont v. Belk, 722 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed a district court's denial of a Rule 39(b) motion where both the defendant and
the Court believed that the case was to be tried to a jury and had prepared accordingly, only to
learn at the pretrial conference that the plaintiff desired a bench trial and that no demand had
actually been filed. See id at 235-38. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit observed that although the
defendant could have perhaps more closely scrutinized the pleadings, the fact that "the district
court had apparently been led to believe"-by the plaintiff, no less-"that the case was to be
tried by a jury" was of "prime importance." See id. at 238. Because the court was already
planning on a jury trial, granting the Rule 39(b) motion "would not have unduly affected the
court's administration of its business." Deeming that case to be "uniquely characterized" by
misleading statements from the plaintiff, the defendant's "good faith, and the district court's
readiness up until a week before trial to try this case to a jury," the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the district court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 39(b) motion. See id.
That is exactly what happened here. Regardless of whether a formal written demand for
a jury trial was ever filed, both WinCo and the Nelson Parties litigated this case for over three
years expecting to reach a jury trial. The Court expected a jury trial, too, and had calendared one
five times. With those expectations squarely in place, WinCo cannot possibly have been
prejudiced by trying its case to a jury, as it had always planned to do. And the Court's
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administration would have sustained no impact, as it had scheduled a jury trial from the
beginning of the case, including in November 2016. The timing of the Nelson Parties' Rule
39(b) motion was more than fair. The Nelson Parties filed it immediately after WinCo stated, for
the first time in over three years, that it didn't want a jury trial after all. And although the claims
at issue contained some equitable claims (like alter ego and unjust enrichment), the majority of
them-including WinCo's central claim-were legal in nature (breach of contract, personal
liability, fraud, and violation ofldaho's Consumer Protection Act). The parties even discussed
with the Court, on November 20, 2015, procedures for trying both legal and equitable claims.
The rule is that a District Court should grant a Rule 39(b) motion unless there is a
persuasive reason not to. Here, not only was there no such reason, but WinCo, the Nelson
Parties, and the Court anticipated a jury trial until WinCo reneged on its stipulation at the
eleventh hour. Even if there was no demand and no stipulation, the District Court still should
have convened a jury trial pursuant to Rule 39(b), and it abused its discretion by failing to do so.
This Court should vacate the judgment and remand to the District Court for a jury trial.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT NELSON IS
PERSONALLY LIABLE IS BASED ON LEGAL ERROR.
The District Court determined that Nelson was personally liable under the Trial Period,

the Portland Agreement, and the Boise Agreement pursuant to theories of undisclosed principal
and pre-incorporation liability. That determination is premised upon a fundamental
misunderstanding of the facts surrounding, and the difference between, the three contracts.
"Formation of a contract is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve." Inland
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Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 702, 779 P .2d 15, 16 (1989). "Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Idaho R. Civ. P.
52(a)(7). "[A] factual finding will not be deemed clearly erroneous unless, after reviewing the
entire record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." County of Canyon v. Wilkerson, 123 Idaho 377, 381-82, 848 P.2d 435, 439--40 (Ct. App.
1993). "[C]lear error will not be deemed to exist if the findings are supported by substantial and
competent, though competing, evidence." Id. at 382, 848 P.2d at 440.
However, to the extent the District Court misconstrued or misapplied legal principles, this
Court reviews that misconstruction or misapplication de novo. See Schulz, 151 Idaho at 865, 264
P.3d at 972. Here, the District Court's error was not so much in its facts, but in how it failed to
appreciate how legal principles of contract formation govern and apply those facts. As the
following sections demonstrate, the District Court erroneously applied those principles, and this
Court should reverse that determination.
1.

The District Court's Definition of the "Contract" Between WinCo and KDN
Is Contrary to Idaho Law Regarding an Indefinite Quantities Contract.

The District Court missed the key distinction between the Trial Period, the Portland
Agreement, and the Boise Agreement. They are different, and that difference has legal
implications.
Basic contract principles govern this issue. "Formation of a valid contract requires that
there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract.
This manifestation takes the form of an offer and acceptance." P. 0. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks
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Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,238, 159 P.3d 870, 875 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). An enforceable contract also requires consideration, or "action by the promisee
which is bargained for and given in exchange for the promise." See Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp.,
91 Idaho 605,607,428 P.2d 524, 526 (1967). "[T]o be enforceable, an agreement must be
sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and requirements so that it can be determined what
acts are to be performed and when performance is complete." Bajrektarevic v. Lighthouse Home

Loans, Inc., 143 Idaho 890, 892, 155 P.3d 691,693 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"[A] reservation to either party of an unlimited right to determine the nature and extent of his
performance renders his obligation too indefinite for legal enforcement, making it, as it is
termed, merely illusory." Thomas v. Cate, 78 Idaho 29, 32,296 P.2d 1033, 1034 (1956) (quoting

Corthell v. Summit Thread Co., 167 A. 79, 81 (Me. 1933)).
The District Court found that the Trial Period, the Portland Agreement, and the Boise
Agreement were all one indefinite quantities contract, but that finding ignores these basic
contract principles. The Trial Period permitted KDN to perform concrete joint repair work on at
most three-and only three-WinCo stores. WinCo could pull any store from KDN's worklist.
In other words, WinCo's promise was illusory until KDN actually commenced work. Just as
Nelson testified, there was no agreement with WinCo until work actually started. And it is
undisputed that that Trial Period work was intended to see how KDN would work out as a
contractor. WinCo not only reserved the right to not permit KDN to work on additional stores,
but WinCo had not yet even identified additional stores requiring concrete joint repair. The
Portland Agreement followed only when KDN satisfactorily completed work on the three stores
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the Trial Period contemplated, and WinCo elected to have KDN proceed with other, to-bedetermined stores. The Boise Agreement did not follow until after the Portland Agreement.
The District Court misapprehended, as a matter of law, what an indefinite quantities
contract is. It correctly recognized that, with such a contract, "the buyer must be obligated to
purchase a minimum quantity in order for the agreement to be enforceable," and "without an
obligatory minimum quantity, the buyer would be allowed to order nothing, rendering its
obligations illusory and, therefore, unenforceable." R Vol. I, p. 5034 (quoting Torncello v.

United States, 681 F.2d 756, 761 (Cl. Ct. 1982)). But the District Court incorrectly defined an
indefinite quantities contract's enforceability. If an indefinite-quantities contract includes a
guaranteed minimum quantity, the "proper remedy" is to enforce the guaranteed minimum
quantity provision and "to sever the unenforceable provision"-the illusory promise to purchase
an indefinite amount of goods in the future. See United Services Auto. Ass 'n v. Pelis, No. 519697-I, 2004 WL 792666, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. April 12, 2004); see also Cummings-Reedv. United

Health Group, No. 2:15-CV-02359-JAM-AC, 2016 WL 1734873, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2016).
The parties then become legally obligated or accountable to each other for future purchases only
upon the "contemporaneous exchange of consideration"-meaning, in this circumstance, new
and definite promises to buy and sell. Cf TMC Worldwide, L.P. v. Gray, 178 S.W.3d 29, 37
(Tex. Ct. App. 2005). In other words, parties may have an indefinite quantities contract, but only
the portion of the contract that the parties have agreed to is actually enforceable-or, put
differently, is actually a "contract."
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With these principles in place, there were, at least, three contracts between KDN and
WinCo: the Trial Period, the Portland Agreement, and the Boise Agreement. By definition and
operation of law, the Trial Period did not start until WinCo's promise to permit KDN to perform
work became irrevocable, and that did not occur until KDN started work. And most certainly,
the Portland Agreement did not arise until KDN completed the Trial Period and WinCo
authorized it to work on other stores. The same goes for the Boise Agreement. The District
Court's contrary characterization of the KDN-Win Co contract fails to conform to established
contract principles.

2.

The District Court's Determination that Nelson Is Liable to WinCo Under
the Agreement Pursuant to an Undisclosed Principal Theory Is Premised
Upon Legal Error.

An agent will not be held liable on a contract if he discloses to the other contracting party
that (1) the agent is acting for a principal and (2) the principal's identity. See Agrisource, Inc. v.

Johnson, 156 Idaho 903,908,322 P.3d 815, 820 (2014). The District Court found that Nelson
"presented no evidence that she clearly and affirmatively disclosed to WinCo at or prior to
January of 2010 that she was acting as an agent for a yet-to-be-formed corporation named "KDN
Management, Inc. d/b/a KD Concrete Design," or even "KDN." R Vol. I, p. 5034. But that
finding runs contrary to the principles articulated above.
Although KDN was not formed as of January 2010, it was formed on February 18, 2010,
prior to commencing any work for WinCo. As explained above, WinCo could have pulled out of
the Trial Period right up to the day upon which KDN started work. Up until that day, any
contract was illusory, meaning it lacked consideration-there was, therefore, no contract. It was
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undisputed at trial that KDN commenced work after February 18, 2010. Therefore, KDN was
properly formed prior to entering into the Trial Period. The District Court's characterization of
KDN as a "yet to be formed corporation," as of the effective date of the Trial Period, violates
these basic contract principles. It is certainly inaccurate as to the Portland Agreement and the
Boise Agreement.
Moreover, Nelson disclosed all she needed to disclose regarding her fully-formed
principal. Even leaving aside Nelson's insistence that she disclosed KDN's precise name and
corporate identity on two occasions, she indisputably disclosed the name "KD Concrete," that it
was the name of a business entity separate from her, and that it was a corporation. Even Little
identified "KD Concrete Design, Inc.," and "KDN," in his written, attorney-reviewed testimony.
Douty also testified that he knew WinCo had contracted with a business entity, not with Nelson
personally. WinCo admitted that it registered "KD Concrete" in its accounts payable software.
And when WinCo subsequently received a W-9 listing "KDN Management Inc.," or issued a
check to "KDN Management Inc.," it never protested that it had no idea who, or what, "KDN
Management Inc." was. Without question, WinCo knew that it was dealing with a corporation,
not Nelson personally. That is, quite literally, the only evidence on the record on that subject.
Where WinCo knew that was contracting with a corporation, and not Nelson personally,
whether it knew it was contracting with "KD Concrete" or "KDN Management Inc." is legally
irrelevant. In Nadeau Painting Specialist, Ltd. v. Dalcor Property Management, Inc., No. 03-0600060-CV, 2008 WL 2777724 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008 July 18, 2008) (unpublished), the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant agent was personally liable on a contract because it made only a
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partial disclosure of its principal. See id. at *8. The plaintiff admitted that "sufficient evidence
exists of its knowledge that [the defendant] was representing the limited partnerships ... [but]
conten[ded] that [the defendant] never disclosed the legal names of the limited partnerships." Id.
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument. It observed that the defendant disclosed its "agency
status" and that "each of its four principals would be responsible for payment." Id. at *8-9. The
court then held that "there is legally and factually sufficient evidence that [the plaintiff] had
agreed to look solely to the limited partnerships for payment." Id. at *9. In other words, the
point of the disclosure rule is to not to catch agents in technicalities; rather, it is to ensure that a
party contracting with an agent receives the contract it intended. Requiring agents to disclose the
exact legal name of their principal is "out-of-step with modern commercial realities." Id. at *9
n.9.
Idaho law does not distinguish between disclosing a business entity agent by its
registered name versus the name under which it does business, and WinCo offered no evidence
that the difference between "KDN" and "KD Concrete" mattered to it one whit. In fact, all the
evidence presented at trial was to the contrary. Even assuming that Nelson disclosed "KD
Concrete" rather than "KDN Management Inc.," WinCo knew that it was dealing with a
corporation that was Nelson's principal, not Nelson herself.
In any event, and at a minimum, there was no dispute at trial that Nelson disclosed KDN,
by name, when she returned the W-9 form-especially given that WinCo would not have paid
KDN anything beyond its first payment without a completed W-9 form on file. That occurred
prior to commencement of the Portland Agreement, and certainly prior to the commencement of
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the Boise Agreement. Given that the Trial Period, the Portland Agreement, and the Boise
Agreement constitute two separate agreements, the District Court should have, at a minimum,
cabined Nelson's personal liability under any undisclosed principal theory to the stores
encompassed by the Trial Period, or, at most, the Portland Agreement. See Crosse v. Callis, 282
A.2d 86, 91 (Md. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that even though a disclosure was "not made until
after one contract had been entered into, the disclosure would be operative as to further contracts
if fully made before such new contracts are consummated"). In no way could Nelson's personal
liability encompass the Boise Agreement; WinCo plainly knew that it had contracted with KDN,
a corporation, prior to entering into the Boise Agreement.
The Court should reverse the District Court's determination that Nelson is liable to
WinCo on an undisclosed principal theory. Alternatively, and at a minimum, it should cabin
Nelson's liability under that theory to the stores encompassed by the Trial Period or, at most, the
Portland Agreement.

3.

The District Court's Determination that Nelson Is Liable to WinCo Pursuant
to a Pre-Incorporation Liability Theory Is Premised Upon Legal Error.

Idaho Code§ 30-1-204 states that "[a]ll persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a
corporation, when there was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable
for liabilities created while so acting." "[L]iabilities," as used in LC.§ 30-1-204, arise when a
contract is executed-meaning when the parties become "legally obligated or accountable," not
when the contract is breached. See Liability, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see e.g.,

Silvers v. R & FCapital Corp., 858 P.2d 895,897 (Or. App. 1993).

34

The District Court concluded that Nelson was personally liable (under, ostensibly, both
the Trial Period and the Agreement) because she "contracted on behalf of KDN prior to its
incorporation." R Vol. I, p. 5039. But again, the District Court's characterization of the Trial
Period, the Portland Agreement, and the Boise Agreement ignores principles of contract law.
The Trial Period did not commence until KDN started working. KDN was indisputably
incorporated prior to that date. And KDN was plainly incorporated before embarking on the
Portland Agreement and, certainly, the Boise Agreement.
The Court should reverse the District Court's determination that Nelson is liable to
WinCo pursuant to Idaho Code§ 30-1-204. Alternatively, and at a minimum, it should cabin
Nelson's liability under that theory to the stores encompassed by the Trial Period or, at most, the
Portland Agreement-certainly not the Boise Agreement.

C.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DETERMINING
THAT THE NELSON PARTIES ARE EACH ALTER EGOS OF ONE ANOTHER.
"[I]ssues of alter ego and veil-piercing claims are equitable decisions." Wandering

Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 591, 329 P.3d 368, 371 (2014). "In
these cases, the trial court is responsible for determining factual issues that exist with respect to
this equitable remedy and for fashioning the equitable remedy." Id. "This Court reviews the
district court's rulings on equitable remedies for an abuse of discretion." Climax, LLC v. Snake

River Oncology of E. Idaho, PLLC, 149 Idaho 791,794,241 P.3d 964,967. Again, an abuse of
discretion inquiry asks: "(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
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consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise ofreason." Goodspeed, 154 Idaho at 869- 70, 303 P.3d at
228-29 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reviews questions of law de novo. See

Schulz, 151 Idaho at 863 , 264 P .3d at 972. It reviews findings of fact for clear error. See Idaho
R. Civ. P. 52(a)(7). Here, the District Court failed to appreciate principles of Utah law, as well
as laws governing pass-through entities, and fashioned its equitable remedy based on those
erroneous legal principles. This Court should reverse the District Court's alter ego
determination.
Utah law governs whether any of the Nelson Parties are alter egos of one another. See
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 307 ( 1971) ("The local law of the state of incorporation will
be applied to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder's liability to the corporation for
assessments or contributions and to its creditors for corporate debts."); 17 William Meade
Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law ofPrivate Corps. § 8326 (rev. ed. 2006)
("[L ]iability of a shareholder for corporate debts and the extent and character of that liability are
to be determined by the law of the incorporating state .... "). KDN is a Utah corporation, and
KD3 and SealSource are Utah limited liability companies. Utah law therefore governs the
Court's alter ego analysis. 9

Idaho's alter ego test is not materially different than Utah's. See Hayhurst v. Boyd, 50
Idaho 752, 761, 300 P. 895, 898 (1931).
9
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Utah law makes it difficult to pierce the corporate veil. Presumptively, Utah limited
liability companies and corporations are entities separate and distinct from their members or
shareholders. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-3a-l 04(1) ("A limited liability company is an entity
distinct from its member or members."); Utah Code Ann.§ 16-lOa-622(2) ("Unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder or subscriber for shares of a corporation is
not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation solely by reason of the ownership of
the corporation's shares."). Therefore, Utah courts authorize piercing a corporate veil only
"reluctantly and cautiously." See Colman v. Colman, 743 P .2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Specifically, Utah courts are "extraordinarily reluctant to lift the veil in contract cases, such as
this one, where the creditor has willingly transacted business with the corporation." See d'Elia v.
Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, ,r 28, 147 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks omitted).
That backdrop informs Utah's two requirements for piercing a corporate veil:
(1) [ s]uch a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the

corporation and the individual no longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the
alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, the corporate form
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an inequity.
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 500 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The second prong is
defined as the "fairness prong," and to satisfy it, WinCo "cannot merely show difficulty in
satisfying debt. ... Instead, [WinCo] must provide evidence of bad faith." See d 'Elia, 2006 UT
App 416, ,r 30 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
This is, above all, a contract case. The trial evidence clearly and unambiguously
indicates that WinCo knew it was contracting with a business entity, not an individual.
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Requiring WinCo to collect against a business entity, and not Nelson personally, cannot violate
its expectations. See Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App 237,139,239 P.3d 308 ("[W]e see no
injustice where Ottens was aware that the corporation had some involvement long before trial.").
Moreover, the trial evidence clearly and unambiguously indicates that each of the Nelson Parties
made required state filings, maintained separate bank accounts, filed separate tax returns, and
maintained separate accounting records.
The District Court based its determination of alter ego on its finding that "assets were
meticulously siphoned off by Ms. Nelson and her other two companies, knowing KDN had a
potential outstanding significant liability to WinCo." R Vol. I, p. 5051. But as a matter of Utah
law, the movement of money among various parties is, in and of itself, insufficient to support a
determination of alter ego. In Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39,284 P.3d
630, the Utah Supreme Court held that "merely demonstrating that shareholders withdrew funds
from corporate accounts is an insufficient basis on which to pierce the corporate veil absent
additional evidence that the withdrawals were not legitimate or that the company failed to
properly account for the withdrawals." See id. 127. A single question looms over WinCo's alter
ego claim and the District Court's analysis of that claim: "Why did KDN spend all the money
WinCo paid it, when KDN knew that it was liable to WinCo?" That question presumes that
KDN (or Nelson) knew KDN was liable to WinCo, and that KDN had no right to spend income
it had received from WinCo. Neither presumption is supported by any trial evidence.
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1.

Neither KDN Nor Nelson Knew of Its Liability to WinCo.

There is no trial evidence supporting any determination that Nelson knew that KDN, or
any other Nelson Party, had any liability to WinCo. Indeed, the District Court's own findings
contradict such a determination. The District Court itself found that "Ms. Nelson has no
personal knowledge regarding the accuracy of the measurements." R Vol. I, p. 5021. The most
that can be said about Nelson is that she did not know whether the linear foot measurements
were accurate. That may have been an example of poor business management, and it may result
in a breach of contract, but it is a far cry from knowing that measurements were inaccurate, such
KDN or Nelson could have expected WinCo to come knocking. Furthermore, knowing whether
KDN' s linear feet measurements were inaccurate would form the basis of a fraud claim. See
April Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell, 156 Idaho 500,509,328 P.3d 480,489 (2014) (outlining

elements of a claim for fraud, including "the speaker's knowledge of [a factual statement's]
falsity"). But WinCo did not bring a fraud claim alleging intentional overcharging on all WinCo
stores. The only liability that KDN or Nelson could possibly have known about, based on the
Court's findings, was liability arising from the Overbilling Fraud and the Weber Fraud, for a
total of $25,042 in damages. Indeed, those are the only fraud claims WinCo brought. This is
exactly why Utah's alter ego test requires a failure to adhere to corporate formalities to "sanction
a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an inequity" for alter ego liability to attach. Without such
fraud, injustice, or inequity, every breach of contract by a business entity would result in the
personal liability of every principal of that entity. The corporate veil would disappear.
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Furthermore, the trial evidence is clear WinCo did not raise overbilling concerns until
May 4, 2012, when Win Co responded to KDN' s demand letter "in part by alleging that [KDN]
had overbilled WinCo." Prior to that time, KDN had demanded that WinCo pay KDN
$344,167.50. Consider that: until May 4, 2012, KDN thought WinCo owed it money, not the
other way around. By the time KDN brought suit against WinCo in October 2012, KDN had
already spent the money Win Co had paid it. None of the trial facts-including the District
Court's own findings-support any suggestion that KDN and Nelson frittered away WinCo's
payments as fast as they could before WinCo demanded reimbursement, knowing they had
overbilled WinCo. Indeed, the opposite is true.
2.

Because KDN Was an S-Corporation, Nelson Was Justified in Utilizing Its
Funds for Personal Use.

As a matter oflaw, it was not improper for Nelson to use WinCo's payments to KDN
for her own use. Nelson was KDN's sole shareholder, and KDN was ans-corporation. Where
an entity is ans-corporation, its income "is treated as the personal income of the individual
stockholder." See United States v. Rouhani, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1230 (M.D. Fla. 2015)
(forfeiture case). Further, "in a Subchapter S corporation the shareholders may withdraw as
much as the corporation's retained earnings account contains .... [I]t is not unusual for a
Subchapter S corporation to make payments to family members or for family-owned vehicles.
The relevant inquiry is whether those payments are charged to a shareholder's account and
whether the shareholder is entitled to withdraw the amount, through his or her account, from the
corporation." See Commercial Cabinet, Inc. v. Quint, 2003 WL 22962070, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
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Dec. 16, 2003) (unpublished disposition). As a matter oflaw, all things being equal, Nelson was
fully authorized to draw as much of KDN's funds as she wished, so long as it didn't defraud
anyone. And, as explained above, it didn't.
The District Court discounted this principal on the ground that the stockholder of an scorporation "must withdraw the corporate income in the form of a salary and distribution and
subsequently use the withdrawn funds for personal items." R Vol. I, p. 5050. "Treating the Scorporation as a personal piggy bank and classifying personal expenses as corporate expenses
presents a vastly different scenario." Id. The two cases the District Court cited for this
proposition are inapposite here. Although in United States v. Rouhani, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1227, the
court stated that the sole shareholder of an s-corporation "was entitled to take a salary and
distributions" from the s-corporation, it did not speak to what amounts were appropriate for such
salary or distributions, whether those amounts would have mattered in its analysis, or whether
the manner in which the salary and distributions were accounted for was material. See id. at
1230. Moreover, in Rouhani, the defendant was the sole shareholder of a company that
employed forty-eight employees, and the defendant "determined whether and to what extent [the
corporation] would pay its employees bonuses." See id. at 1229. The sole shareholder
"purchased a number of homes for his family members with distributions from [the corporation]
and continued to pay the tax and insurance costs on those properties," his family members "lived
in the houses rent free," and the sole shareholder and his wife-and the corporation-"gave a
$25,650.00 gift to [the shareholder's] church." See id. Strikingly, the court found no alter ego
under these facts, even though the sole shareholder used the corporation, in the District Court's
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parlance, as his "personal piggy bank." Politte v. United States, 2012 WL 965996 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 21, 2012) (unpublished), was a tax refund case. See id. at * 1. The s-corporation "operated
between six and ten Midas franchise shops in the San Diego area. " See id. The two plaintiffs
were not the sole shareholders; they owned 74% of the s-corporation's issued and outstanding
shares. See id.
In contrast to those cases, KDN was a single-shareholders-corporation. Although Nelson
sought to generate additional business for KDN, it essentially did one job: the WinCo job. That
work concluded in August 2010. WinCo did not even begin to discover the purported
overstatements-which, as explained above, with the exception of three stores, the District Court
found were mere breaches of contract and not frauds-until November 2011, and it did not
actually assert a claim against KDN for overpayment until late 2012. During that time, Nelson
continued to keep money in KDN's bank account, even though it was in a business development
phase and not actually doing additional concrete projects. Critically, Nelson also paid taxes on
the income she received from KDN. The District Court rejected the significance of KDN as an
s-corporation because it saw a distinction between Nelson causing KDN to pay personal
expenses and Nelson causing KDN to distribute money to her personal account, and then paying
personal expenses. But from WinCo's perspective, there is no difference-Nelson could have
caused KDN to make herself a $1 million distribution in August 2010, and WinCo's concern
would have been satisfied. None of these factors was present in either the Rouhani or Politte
cases. And WinCo's and the District Court's point, if approved, would mean that a singleshareholder s-corporation must wait until the statute of limitations on all potential liabilities has
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expired before distributing any money-otherwise, the distribution is tantamount to the
shareholder taking money from the s-corporation with pending liabilities. That is an inequitable
and unrealistic outcome.
Assume all of the Court's findings regarding Nelson's "siphoning" are true: Nelson drew
funds from KDN to pay for the birthday parties of nieces and nephews, personal foreign exotic
travel, elaborate family vacations, cars, personal credit card payoffs, personal gifts, and house
payments. As a matter of law, she was allowed to. She did it before WinCo articulated even a
single concern about KDN's billing. The District Court too readily discounted this important
point.
The Court should reverse the District Court's determination of alter ego as against
Nelson. It should reverse that determination as against KD3 and SealSource for the same
reasons.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Nelson Parties were entitled to a jury trial, and both WinCo and the Court expected
one. Even leaving aside that enormous deprivation, the District Court's determinations of
Nelson's personal liability and the Nelson Parties' alter ego ignored key principles oflaw. For
these reasons, reasons, the Court should vacate the District Court's judgment and reverse for
further proceedings consistent with the Nelson Parties' arguments, including jury trial.
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